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I

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE
of the LeRoy Collard Trust,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
NAGLE CONSTRUCTION, INC., a Utah
corporation, GARY M. NAGLE and
MARILYN F. NAGLE, individuals,

Case No. 20000976-CA

Defendants-Appellants.
GARY M. NAGLE,
Counterclaim PlaintiffAppellant
vs.
KATHRYN COLLARD, TRUSTEE
of the LeRoy Collard Trust,
Counterclaim DefendantAppellee.

APPELLANTS REPLY BRIEF
CORRECTIONS TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
On page 2 of Appellee's Brief, and elsewhere throughout the brief, Appellee
("Collard") has stated that Mr. Collard "assumed" the Nagles' mortgage loan. While
payments were made on the loan by Collard, there never was an assumption of that loan.
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An assumption requires, at the very least, that Collard become legally obligated to the bank
for the payment of that loan [See Black's Law Dictionary under "Assumption" and
"Assumption of Indebtedness"] and may require an application by the assuming party to the
lender for approval of the assumption [See §57-15-8, U.C.A.]. That was not done at any
time.
On pages 2 and 3 of Collard's brief, it is stated that Nagle "continued to accept
direct payments on the mortgage to FSB." There was no acceptance by Nagle of those
payments. They were made directly to the bank on behalf of Nagle while Nagle waited for
Collard to perform under the contract by payment of the balance of the purchase price and
by assumption of the loan.
Disposition in the Lower Court
Collard admits that the lower court held that the statute of limitations barred
both parties' legal claims and requested briefing on the issue of whether the court had
equitable power to grant relief to Collard. However, Collard then states on page 4 of her
brief that the lower court "modified its previous ruling." There is no indication in the court's
decision that it modified its previous ruling. It simply ignored its previous ruling and decided
it had equitable power to grant relief to Collard without also doing equity to Nagle.
Collard further states, on page 4 of her brief, that the lower court also held that
Nagle's claims "all failed on the merits, or were waived and/or barred." There was no
determination on the merits of this case. The court simply decided that the statute of
limitations barred the claims.

2

CORRECTION TO APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS
On page 5 of her brief, Collard states that she "disputed the factual allegations
contained in paragraphs 7, 8, 9-11 of the Nagles' 'Statement of Facts' regarding the value
of the 55,000 shares of stock conveyed by Mr. Collard." That, of course, raised an issue of
fact which precluded the lower court from granting a summary judgment. However, since
the lower court nevertheless granted summary judgment to Collard, Nagle's statement of
those facts must be accepted as true in reviewing that judgment. Winegar v. Froerer, 813
P.2d 104, 107 (Utah 1991) [On a motion for summary judgment, the court must accept all
facts and inferences in the light most favorable to the losing party]. The lower court
declined to make a finding as to those facts because, on a motion for summary judgment,
it cannot make findings as to disputed facts, not, as Collard Claims, because it held that
Nagle's claims failed as a matter of law.
In paragraphs 4-8 on pages 5 and 6 of her brief, Collard attempts to sever the
contract into three separate parts by calling the various parts of the purchase price
installments. Despite this attempt, the contract remains one unseverable contract and the
full amount of the purchase price must be paid before a deed is due under the contract.
In paragraph 8 on page 6 of her brief, Collard states that Mr. Collard tendered
55,000 shares of stock in San Juan Mining and Developing Company "as required" by the
contract. The fact is that the contract required delivery of 55,000 shares of Utah Coal and
Chemical Company stock. The fact that San Juan Mining and Developing Company may
have been a predecessor of Utah Coal and Chemical Company does not mean the shares
of one are equivalent to the shares of the other. In any event the shares offered were not
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worth the amount required by the contract and did not satisfy the requirement of the
contract.
In paragraph 19 on page 9 of her brief, Collard states that she wrote a letter with
documentation demonstrating that the stock in question "could have been sold for the
required $85,000.00 on any number of dates between its delivery and the letter of January
13, 1981." While this statement is irrelevant because the lower court refused to make a
finding on the value of the stock, since Nagle had submitted evidence to the contrary, the
fact is that the letter from Collard only included information on the prices for the stock from
January 1, 1979, through March of 1979 [See Exhibit A attached hereto], which was six
months before the stock was delivered and Addendum #2 to the contract was signed.
[Nagle Deposition, p. 30, lines 3-5; p. 41, lines 3-5; see Exhibit B attached hereto].
In paragraph 20 on page 10 of her brief, Collard asserts that the stock could
have been sold for the $85,000. Nagle submitted evidence to the contrary and the lower
court, on a motion for summary judgment, quite properly refused to make a finding on this
disputed set of facts. Again, since the court ruled against Nagle, his view of the facts must
be accepted as true in reviewing that decision.
In paragraph 23 on page 10 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle retained the
stock. That, too, is irrelevant since the stock was worthless and could not be sold [Nagle
Deposition, p. 52, lines 6-10; see Exhibit B attached hereto] and, under the contract, it was
Collard's obligation to make up the difference between the value of the stock and the
$85,000.00.
In paragraph 30 on page 12 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle's claims were
based "solely on Mr. Collard's alleged breaches of the parties' Contract prior to January 25,
4

1981." The fact is that Nagle's claims were based upon Collard's continuing breach in having
failed to pay the purchase price which was the condition precedent to delivery of the deed.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE LOWER COURT FOUND THAT COLLARD HAD NOT
FULLY PERFORMED, DID NOT QUIET TITLE TO THE
PROPERTY IN COLLARD AND ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT
THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS BARRED RECOVERY OF
THE PURCHASE PRICE.
1. Despite Collard's assertions to the contrary, the lower court concluded that
Collard had not fully performed under the contract.
Collard continues, throughout her brief, to misrepresent the lower court's ruling.
On page 16, she again asserts that "the lower court correctly concluded t h a t . . . Collard, had
performed all of the actions or 'Installments' required for his receipt of the title to the
Property . . ." This statement is simply not true. The lower court did not ever find or
conclude that Collard had performed all of the requirements of the contract. The court did
find that the down payment had been paid, which was not disputed, but the court expressly
refused to make a finding with respect to the value of the stock delivered [Finding #15,
Exhibit E, Addendum to Appellant's Brief] and thus could not and did not conclude that the
$85,000 in value had been delivered. While the court did enter a conclusion that Nagle had
waived the assumption requirement [Conclusion #8], it did so without any finding of fact to
support that conclusion and without any evidence upon which such a finding could be based
[See Appellant's Brief, Point II] and, in contradiction to that conclusion, it concluded that
Collard's right to a deed had not arisen and was "conditioned upon payment of the
remaining balance owed on the FSB Obligation." [Conclusions # # 1 4 & 15, Exhibit E,
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Addendum to Appellant's Brief]. That conclusion can only mean that Collard had not
performed all the requirements of the contract, specifically the requirement to assume the
FSB obligation. That conclusion also means that the requirement to assume the FSB
obligation had not been waived because the court required that obligation to be paid by
Collard as a condition to performance by Nagle. Payment in full of the FSB obligation is
a greater requirement than assumption of that obligation but would obviously fulfill or
replace the assumption requirement.
The significance of that requirement by the lower court (to pay FSB as a
condition to receipt of a deed) cannot be overemphasized. It represents a conclusion that
the contract had not been fully performed, that the contract was still alive and subject to suit
for non-performance, that the statute of limitations had not expired and that Collard was not
entitled to a deed until the purchase price had been fully paid. Thus, the whole basis of the
lower court's decision must crumble. The statute of limitations had not expired with respect
to the enforcement of the contract by Nagle.
Collard has argued, on page 17 of her brief, that the lower court's conclusion of
waiver of the assumption requirement was based on "Nagles' own admissions." There is no
such finding by the court and none of the references in that paragraph of her brief states
that Nagle made any such admissions. Nagle, in fact, made no such admissions, the court
made no such findings and, as pointed out above, the court's conclusion that delivery of a
deed was conditioned upon payment of FSB is a conclusion that the assumption requirement
was not waived.
It is, therefore, obvious that the lower court did not find or conclude that Collard
had performed all of the requirements of the contract. The court specifically did not find
6

that Collard had delivered the $85,000 in value and specifically concluded that the
assumption requirement had not been met. Thus, Collard was in default and was not
entitled to receive a deed to the property.
2. The lower court should not have considered the statute of limitations defense
raised by Collard.
Collard argues on pages 18-19 of her brief that Nagle waived any argument that
the lower court erred in considering Collard's statute of limitations defense. Her stated
reasons are without support. The fact that Nagle properly pleaded the statute of limitations
in his Answer and Counterclaim does not excuse Collard from failing to properly plead the
statute as required by Rule 9(h), U.R.C.P. She further asserts that no other statute of
limitations could apply. That also is not an excuse for failing to comply with Rule 9(h). She
asserts that Wasatch Mines Co. v. Hopkinson, 24 U.2d 70, 465 P.2d 1007 (Utah 1970), the
case cited by Nagle, is distinguishable on this ground. She misreads that case, since it did
not involve a claim for fraud as she asserts and there was only one possible statute of
limitations that could apply in that case. Wasatch Mines further reversed the lower court's
application of the inadequately pleaded statute of limitation even though that argument was
not raised in the lower court (a fact which is clear from reading the entire opinion). Thus,
Wasatch Mines is controlling in this case. The more recent case of Conder v. Hunt, 1 P.3d
558, 563-4 (Utah App. 2000), followed Wasatch Mines in holding that the failure to properly
plead the correct statute of limitations as required by Rule 9(h) is fatal to the assertion of
that claim, even though not asserted in the lower court. Conder went on to refuse to
consider other statutes of limitations that might apply since they were not properly pleaded.
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3. The lower court could but did not modify its ruling that both parties were
barred by the statute of limitations.
It is not contested that the lower court could modify its earlier ruling that the
statute of limitations barred both parties from relief. It is simply pointed out that the lower
court did not modify its earlier ruling. No where in the record is there a statement by the
court that it changed its mind or modified its earlier ruling. Of course, in preparing the
findings and conclusions, Collard omitted the court's ruling against it on this point but it is
significant that Collard did not include a statement that the court had modified that ruling.
In fact, the court did not change its mind. It had asked the parties to find an equitable
ground upon which it could order a deed to be delivered to Collard. After the second
hearing, it believed it had found such a ground and directed Collard to prepare findings and
conclusions consistent with her argument. Her argument was that she was entitled to a deed
as soon as she paid off the FSB obligation. That required the court to order specific
performance of the contract by Nagle, that is, to deliver a deed, which is an equitable
remedy.

However, the court failed to require equity on Collard's side by paying the

purchase price. The determination that Collard was entitled to a deed after she paid the
FSB obligation meant that the contract was still in force. If the contract was still in force,
the whole contract was in force and could not be severed.
4. The lower court did not quiet title in Collard and she did not establish the
elements necessary to quiet title. Thus, the claim that she was not barred by the
statute of limitations is not applicable.
Collard argues, on pages 20-21 of her brief, that she is not barred by the statute
of limitations because, she asserts, the statute of limitations does not bar one in possession
of property from seeking to quiet title. She relies on Conder v. Hunt, supra, to support that
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argument. In fact, Conder v. Hunt at 564, states that "no Utah case cited by the parties
specifically adopts this rule . . . [and] a definitive ruling on the question must await a case
in which it is more squarely in issue." Thus, Collard's reliance on that case is misplaced.
However, a glance at the judgment in this case demonstrates that the lower court did not
quiet title in Collard but rather ordered specific performance of the contract by ordering
delivery of a deed. While that judgment lacks support, for reasons set forth in Appellant's
Brief and elsewhere herein, there was no basis for a quiet title judgment in favor of Collard
in this matter. One who seeks to quiet title must prevail on the strength of his own title and
not on the weakness of the other party's title. Music Service Corp. v. Walton, 20 U.2d 16,
432 P.2d 334, 337-8 (Utah 1967) [A case in which the Supreme Court remanded for further
proceedings since neither party had established a right to quiet title]. Church v. Meadow
Springs Ranch Corp., Inc., 659 P.2d 1045, 1048-9 (Utah 1983) ['To succeed in an action to
quiet title to real estate, a plaintiff must prevail on the strength of his own title and not on
the weakness of a defendant's title or even its total lack of title."] Collard's only claim to
title was pursuant to the contract which she sought to enforce. She did not prove any right,
and the court did not grant quiet title, based on adverse possession, chain of title or any
other ground. Nagle, on the other hand, held actual recorded title to the property, based
on a chain of title of record, and no weakness in his title was demonstrated. A quiet title
judgment for Collard could not have been entered. The judgment was simply an order to
specifically perform a contract. Thus, the argument that one in possession of property is not
barred by the statute of limitations from seeking to quiet title is not applicable.
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5. Collard's argument that her "quiet title" claim had not accrued while Nagle's
claims had expired contradicts her argument that Nagle waived the assumption
requirement
On page 21 of her brief, Collard asserts that her "quiet title" claim had not
accrued yet. The first response to this is that her claim was not a quiet title claim but a
claim for specific performance and the lower court so held. [See point 4, above]. Secondly,
this argument contradicts her argument that Nagle waived the assumption requirement. The
lower court required Collard to pay FSB in full as a condition to receipt of the deed. As
set forth in point 1, above, this means that Collard had not fully performed and the contract
was still subject to suit for non-performance. However, if, as Collard argues, Nagle had
waived the assumption requirement in 1981, Collard had performed in 1981 (ignoring the
requirement to pay $85,000 in value, which Collard also claims was due then and now
barred) and was entitled to a deed in 1981. Therefore, Collard was barred after 1987 from
pursuing a claim for the deed. [See pp. 22-23 of Appellant's Brief]. She cannot have it
both ways. Either the assumption requirement was waived and she is barred by the statute
of limitations or the whole unseverable contract is still in force and Nagle is not barred by
the statute of limitations. The lower court's order of specific enforcement, an equitable
remedy, is inequitable unless Collard is also required to do equity by payment of the
purchase price.
6. The pleading of an offset is not required since a counterclaim can be utilized
as an offset Nagle's claims did coexist with Collard's claims.
Collard claims, on page 22 of her brief, that the parties in the cases relied on by
Nagle for the proposition that a counterclaim may be utilized as an offset actually pleaded
offset while Nagle did not is not true. There is no indication in any of those cases that a
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claim for an offset had been pleaded as an affirmative defense and there is no statement in
any of those opinions that an offset must be pleaded as an affirmative defense. In fact, each
of those cases state that a "defendant may therefore utilize a counterclaim, normally barred
by the statute of limitations, to offset a plaintiffs claim," Coulon v. Coulgn, 915 P.2d 1069,
1072 (Utah App. 1996), "the amount due Bunker on the Jacobsen note may be used as an
offset against the amount owed Jacobsen," Jacobsen v. Bunker, 699 P.2d 1208, 1210 (Utah
1985), and a "if a defendant had a counterclaim that otherwise would have been barred by
a statute of limitations, the counterclaim could be set-off against the plaintiffs claim,"
Jacobsen, at 1210, citing Salt Lake City v. Teluride Power Co., 82 Utah 607, 17 P.2d 281
(Utah 1932). Thus, it is not necessary to separately plead offset as an affirmative defense
because the pleading of a counterclaim is the pleading of an offset if the counterclaim is
barred.
Collard's assertion that the claims did not coexist is also false. Again, if her
argument that the assumption requirement was waived in 1981 is accepted, her claim for
specific performance arose in 1981 while Nagle's claim were, admittedly, still alive.
Furthermore, this argument assumes she can sever this nonseverable contract into three
parts in order to apply the statute of limitations to each part separately. It further ignores
the fact that payment of the purchase price was a condition precedent to delivery of the
deed and that delivery of the deed was a promise dependent on payment of the purchase
price. [See pages 16-21 of Appellant's Brief]. Collard has apparently agreed with those
positions since she has not countered them any where in her brief. Since she had not paid
the purchase price, the claim for the purchase price was still alive and coexisted with her
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claim for a deed. Moreover, her position ignores an important policy issue, as stated in
Coulon, at 1073:
This result is consistent with the policy prohibiting a plaintiff from
delaying an action until after a defendant's counterclaim is barred by
the statute of limitations.
This policy is more fully stated in Moffitt v. Barr. 837 P.2d 572, 575 (Utah App. 1992):
[AJppellees' interpretation penalizes "reluctant" litigants, i.e., those
who would rather avoid litigation than assert the claims they possess,
and who take the basically non-litigious position that they will assert
their claims only if the other party brings litigation to fruition by
filing a complaint against them, their real preference being to stay
out of court altogether. . . . If a party files a complaint against a
reluctant litigant, the reluctant litigant may then assert his or her own
right to relief in the form of a counterclaim.
Nagle's claims clearly coexisted with Collard's claims and he was a reluctant
litigant because he knew that when Collard wanted a deed, he would have to pay the
purchase price. The above policy justifies his "wait and see" attitude.
7. Collard's arguments that Nagle's claims were barred are contradictory and
rely upon cases involving earnest money agreements and not Uniform Real
Estate Contracts.
On pages 23-25 of her brief, Collard states that Nagle sent a letter to Collard in
1981 that his default "will result in the institution of legal proceedings against you for
foreclosure of the contract as a note and mortgage." She then argues that this letter did not
satisfy the "strict notice and procedural requirements to effect a forfeiture under the
Contract or Utah law." She ignores the fact that foreclosure and forfeiture are very different
procedures under Uniform Real Estate Contracts and that if a party attempts and fails at
one procedure, he could start over and elect another procedure as long as the default still
exists. She cites McMullin v. Shimmin, 10 U.2d 142, 349 P.2d 720 (Utah 1960), for the
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proposition that the election of forfeiture is exclusive and precludes recovery of any other
damages under the contract or at law. McMullin, and the other authorities she cites, involve
an Earnest Money Receipt and Offer to Purchase, which contains a clause giving the seller
the option to retain the earnest money as liquidated and agreed damages if the buyer fails
to close the sale. Thus, by retaining the earnest money, the seller has elected his remedy
and is barred from suing for specific performance or for actual damages. Those cases do
not apply to situations where the sale has been closed and a final Uniform Real Estate
Contract has been signed, as is the case here, and the buyer has partially performed but fails
to pay some portion of the purchase price. Those Uniform Real Estate Contracts expressly
allow the seller alternative remedies, one of which is forfeiture and another of which is
foreclosure of the contract as a note and mortgage. Neither forfeiture nor foreclosure
requires the seller to refund the down payment and a failure to properly effect a forfeiture
does not preclude the seller from later pursuing foreclosure if a default still persists.
Collard claims that Nagle's attempt to effect a forfeiture failed. Nagle could.
therefore, have abandoned that remedy for the time being and later properly pursued a
forfeiture by following the strict requirements or he could have given notice of his intent to
foreclose the contract. Or, if he assumed that the forfeiture remedy was effective (since it
was not challenged at the time) and Collard became a tenant at will in the property, Nagle
could allow Collard to remain in the property as a tenant at will with the right to evict him
at any point in time.

Collard's payment of the mortgage payments could have been

considered the payment of rent as a tenant. It could also be argued that Collard's claim that
forfeiture was not effective was barred by the statute of limitations since he took no action
within six years of the forfeiture in 1981. None of these issues was considered by the lower
13

court since it's only holding was that Nagle was barred by the statute of limitations from
asserting any of his claims. That holding is the issue that is challenged on this appeal.
POINT II
NAGLE'S CLAIMS OF FAILURE TO PAY THE PURCHASE
PRICE, CONDITION PRECEDENT,
NON-SEVERABLE
CONTRACT AND DEPENDENT PROMISES WERE ALL
PROPERLY PLEADED AND RAISED BELOW AND COLLARD
HAD NOTICE OF THEM.
Collard relies upon Rules 8(c) and 9(c), U.R.C.P., to argue that Nagle waived
its claims of failure to pay the purchase price, condition precedent and dependent promises.
She ignores the provisions of those rules which provide:
When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim
or a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, if justice so
requires, shall treat the pleadings as if there had been a proper
designation. [Rule 8(c)].
In pleading the performance or occurrence of conditions precedent,
it is sufficient to aver generally that all conditions precedent have
been performed or have occurred. A denial of performance or
occurrence shall be made specifically and with particularity, and
when so made the party pleading the performance or occurrence
shall on the trial establish the facts showing such performance or
occurrence. [Rule 9(c)].
In paragraph 18 of Collard's complaint, she alleges that "Collard or his successors have
tendered all sums due and owing under the Contract to Defendants and have otherwise
performed all required acts under the Contract" [R. 3] and, in paragraph 35 of her
complaint, she alleges that "Plaintiffs are entitled to a Declaratory Judgment by this Court
finding that Collard and Plaintiff have fulfilled all of the Buyer's obligations under the
Contract." [R. 5]. In Nagle's Answer and Counterclaim, he not only denies those allegations
in paragraphs 13 and 23 of his Answer [R. 26 & 27], but he affirmatively alleges in his
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Counterclaim [See R. 31-33] the condition precedent in paragraph 21 by quoting from
Addendum # 2 in full, including that buyer shall
bring the total value conveyed to seller to $85,000 before seller
conveys title to premises sold to buyer.
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 25:
Collard never tendered sufficient Stock and/or cash to Nagle so as
to enable Nagle to realize $85,000.
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 29:
Nagle retained the legal title to the Property as security for Collard's
obligations and, under the Contract, he had no obligation to deliver
title to Collard unless and until Collard fully performed his
obligations thereunder.
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 30:
Nagle reasoned that because he held legal title to the Property to
secure Collard's obligations under the Contract, he could simply wait
and eventually, if Collard wanted to obtain legal title, Collard would
have to make good on his obligations and deliver $85,000 worth of
Stock and/or cash to him.
He affirmatively alleges in paragraph 31:
Thus, Nagle chose not to exercise any of his default remedies under
the Contract, satisfied to allow Collard to continue making the
monthly payments to First Security Bank, thus benefitting Nagle by
increasing his equity in the Property and decreasing his personal
liability on the mortgage, knowing that eventually Collard would have
to make good on his obligations if he wanted title to the Property.
Those are specific and particular denials of performance, as required by Rule 9(c), and they
make specific reference to the provisions of the contract where the condition precedent is
set forth. And, since they are set forth in the Counterclaim, they satisfy the requirements
of Rule 8(c). There is no requirement that the words "condition precedent" be used.
Further, the law with respect to dependent promises is a rule of law which applies to all
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contracts and need not be specially pleaded. The burden was, therefore, on Collard to
prove her allegations of performance. She failed to so prove and the lower court found that
she had failed to perform.

The condition precedent has not been performed and

performance by Nagle is not yet due.
POINT III
WITH RESPECT TO THE CONCLUSION ON WAIVER OF
THE ASSUMPTION
REQUIREMENT,
COLLARD
MISUNDERSTANDS THE STANDARDS FOR FINDINGS AND
CONCLUSIONS ON A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT.
Nagle's position on pages 21-23 of Appellant's Brief is simply that the lower
court made no finding of fact which would support its conclusion of lav/ that Nagle waived
the assumption requirement. Collard argues that there is evidence in the record to support
that conclusion and that Nagle has failed to marshall the evidence to show that the findings
of fact are clearly erroneous. Since there is no such finding of fact, there is no need to
marshall evidence to support it. Further, the requirement of marshalling evidence does not
apply on a motion for summary judgment since the lower court has no business making
findings of fact on disputed evidence. The facts must be totally without dispute in order to
justify a summary judgment and if there is any dispute in the facts, they must be viewed in
the light most favorable to the losing party-Nagle, in this instance. Furthermore, the "clearly
erroneous" standard of Rule 52(a), U.R.C.P., only applies in "actions tried upon the facts
without a jury . . . ." There was no trial upon the facts in this case. On a motion for
summary judgment, the court could not "assess the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether the relinquishment [of a known right] is clearly intended," as required by Soter's,
Inc. v. Deseret Federal Savings, 857 P.2d 935, 941 (Utah 1993). Whatever, facts may appear
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in the record must be construed in the light most favorable to Nagle which means there was
no intentional relinquishment of his right and no waiver of the assumption requirement.
POINT IV
THE DEFENSE OF LACHES WAS NOT ARGUED BELOW,
WAS NOT CONSIDERED BY THE LOWER COURT AND IS
HYPOCRITICALLY RAISED BY COLLARD HERE.
Having just argued that a claim may not be raised for the first time on appeal,
Collard then argues that laches applies even though it was not argued to the lower court and
the lower court did not make any findings or conclusions with respect to laches. The cases
generally hold that laches does not apply when the statute of limitations has not expired
because, until then, the parties still have rights to enforce.

Since the lower court's

application of the statute of limitations is the substance of this appeal, laches does not apply.
Collard relies on Plateau Mining Co. v. Utah Division of State Lands and Forestry, 802 P.2d
720, 731 (Utah 1990), to support it's laches argument. That case held that laches did not
apply because the party asserting the defense had failed to perform its duty under the
contract. For the same reason, it does not apply here. It is Collard who has failed to
perform under the contract by failing to pay the purchase price.
The argument that Nagle has simply been "sitting and waiting" for some
"propitious event and then, when all risk is over, assert a claim" simply doesn't apply here.
There has been no "propitious" event that prejudices Collard. Nagle has simply been waiting
for Collard to pay the purchase price before he conveys title. That has not prejudiced
Collard in any way. In fact, her whole argument is that, because Nagle has waited so long,
it is he who is prejudiced because he cannot now assert his claim for payment of the
purchase price. Collard's claims of prejudice are false. Though the original contract may
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be lost, all parties have copies which have been submitted to the court and no claims of
prejudice were made below. Furthermore, both parties have submitted evidence of trading
history of the stock demonstrating that such evidence is available. And failing memories
do not come into play here because the only issue is whether the stock was delivered and
whether it had sufficient value to satisfy the contract. There is no question as to what stock
was delivered and the value of the stock can be established by the trading history evidence
which is available. That evidence shows that the stock has been worthless, or nearly so, from
the time it was delivered until the present. There has been no prejudice to Collard by the
passage of time.
Collard's "sitting and waiting" argument is also contrary to the policy set forth in
Coulon and Moffit, above, that encourages reluctant litigants to avoid litigation by waiting
for the other party to first take action. This is especially true where Nagle is not obligated
to deliver a deed until Collard has paid the purchase price. He was fully justified in waiting
for Collard's performance.
POINT V
COLLARD IS NOT ENTITLED TO AN AWARD OF
ATTORNEY'S FEES.
Collard argues that she prevailed on her "preeminent quiet title claim" and is,
therefore, entitled to attorney's fees.

In addition to again misstating the lower court's

holding, she fails to cite any authority that would grant attorney's fees in a quiet title action.
In fact, there is no contract or statutory basis for fees in such a case.
She also ignores the lower court's basis for its ruling and for its refusal to award
attorney's fees. The lower court found no legal basis on which it could grant relief to either
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party and asked the parties to brief the court on whether an equitable ground existed to
require a deed to be delivered to Collard. Since the court was no longer construing the
contract but was acting in equity to grant some remedy to Collard, it concluded that there
was no legal basis on which Collard was entitled to attorney's fees and that it would be
inequitable to award such fees. That, incidentally, was the only equity the court granted to
Nagle, having refused to require that Collard pay the purchase price, which would have
constituted true equity in this case.
In addition, since the lower court held that Collard was not entitled to a deed
until after she paid off the FSB obligation, which was not done until after conclusion of the
action, it was obvious that Collard's suit was premature and no fees were deserved. The
court did not conclude that Nagle had breached the contract which would be a necessary
basis for an award of fees under the contract. Under the circumstances, the court's refusal
to award fees was amply justified.
Furthermore, even if an award of fees could be justified under the contract, such
an award could only be made against a party to the contract. Nagle Construction Company,
Inc. is the seller under the contract. Gary M. Nagle, as an individual, has not taken an
assignment of the contract and has not assumed any of the obligations of the contract.
There is, therefore, no contractual basis for an award of fees against him.
CONCLUSION
The decision in this case must be reversed because the lower court erred in
applying the law with respect to the statute of limitations. It should not have considered the
statute which Collard failed to plead as required by the rules. If the statute applies to Nagle,
it also applies to Collard, as the court concluded. The court granted an equitable remedy
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to Collard without requiring that she do equity by paying the full purchase price. Nagle's
counterclaim, even if barred, may still be used as an offset against Collard's claim for title,
thus requiring the consideration for the deed to be paid. Payment of the purchase price was
a condition precedent to delivery of the deed and those dependent covenants may not be
severed to force compliance with one without reciprocal compliance with the other.
The lower court concluded that Collard had not fully performed and did not
quiet title in Collard. It erred in applying the statue of limitations to a claim that Collard
had not yet performed.
Nagle's claims were all properly pleaded and raised below and Collard cannot
claim surprise with respect to any one of them. The court's conclusion that the statute of
limitations applied simply made its consideration, in its mind, of those claims unnecessary.
The court's conclusion that Nagle waived the assumption requirement was
without a supporting finding and without supporting evidence. There is no evidence on this
issue and on a motion for summary judgment all material facts must be without dispute and
all facts and inferences must be considered in a light most favorable to the losing party.
The laches argument was not raised and considered below and does not apply
because of Collard's default and Collard is not entitled to attorney's fees.
The lower court's decision in this case must be reversed.
DATED this j £ f day of January, 2002.
Respectfully submitted,
BACKMAN, CLARK & MARSH

Ralph J. Marsh
Attorneys for Defendants-Appellants
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KATHRYN COLLARD
The Law Firm of Kathryn Collard
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Nine Exchange Place
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

21

ADDENDUM
Exhibit A

Kathryn Collard Letter of January 23,1981

Exhibit B

Nagle Deposition Excerpts
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Tab A
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TES KXCHAXGX FLAGS. ST7TTX 2 1 0
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84111

TXXJEPHONS 8 0 1 - 5 3 4 * 1 6 6 3
SRYK COIXARS

January 23, 1981
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DEPOSITION
EXHIBIT
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JAM W. DOYTXU. J S .

Mr. W. Waldan Lloyd
Jensen & Lloyd
870 Commercial Security Bank Tower
50 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
RE: Roy Collard/ Uniform Real Estate Contract dated
March 30, 1978
Dear Mr. Lloyd,
I have enclosed for your information the
Wilson-Davis stock quotation sheets showing the selling
price of Utah Coal & Chemicals Corp, stock subsequent to
the date of the real estat'e contract. These summary sheets
show the number of dates from January 1, 1979 through
March of 1979, when the stock in question could have been
sold for the profit of $85,000.00 referred to in the
contract•
I appreciate your attention to this matter.
Yours, Vei^^Truly,

ccz Roy Collard
Enc.
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TabB

Addendum 2?
A

Yes.

Q

And do you recall when that agreement was

entered into?
A

I think it was in September of '79.

Q

Right about the time that you got the San

Juan stock?
A

That's right.

Q

Was there anywhere in Addendum 2 that

explains, the way you read it, or from your understanding, that in addition to the realization of
$85,000 that he would also pay off the First Security
loan?
A

That's our understanding, yes.

Q

Okay.

your understanding.

My question was -- I know that's
The question is:

Is there

anything in Addendum 2 that you can show me that
talks about the payoff of the First Security loan?
A

It says we'll get $85,000 in cash.

It

doesn't say it'll pay the loan out with it.
Q

So is it your testimony that Addendum 2

replaced Addendum 1 or was in addition to Addendum 1?
A

Well, it replaces it, I believe.
MR. LARSEN:

You can see on page 1 of

Exhibit 1 in paragraph 6 it refers to the loan.

So

WENDY S. ALCOCK - DEPOMAX REPORTING, LLC (801) 328-1188

Q

Had it expired by a long time, short

time, do you remember either way?
A

The two documents speak for themselves.

If this was in September when we got the stock and
registered it, that was September of '79, this is
January of '81, so that's more than a year.
Q

Did you read that letter before it was

sent to Mr. Collard?
A

I assume so.

Q

I assume if it was sent out, it was with

your approval?
A

Yes .

Q

The letter states on paragraph -- last

paragraph of the letter, that Mr. Collard's failure
to deliver the stock would be "deemed by Nagle
Construction to be a breach of the contract and a
default thereunder."

Is that what the letter says?

A

That's what it says.

Q

So it was your position, wasn't it, that

as of January 25th, the deadline, unless the money or
additional stock was delivered, that you considered
the contract to be in default?
A

Yes .

Q

And at that time, as of January 25th,

1981, did you in fact believe that Mr. Collard had
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Q

What about Wilson-Davis Securities?

A

I don't know who that is.

Q

Have you been able to find out -- going

back and looking at what the trading values of these
two stocks were during this period of time?
A

Well, I can tell you this, that in 1979,

from there on, it was just downhill.
they ever became worth anything.
market for them.

I don't think

And there was no

I couldn't get anybody to buy them,

that I knew of.
Q

Do you have any documents or any computer

programs that you've been able to find the value of
these stocks as of, say, between -A

I don't.

Q

-- the date in 1970 and 1980?

A

I do not.

Q

And in the preceding 20 years, Nagle

Construction has gone out of business?
A

Yes .

Q

And apparently the original contract has

been lost, or at least is not here yet?
A

It's not here.

Q

And in the intervening 20 years, Collard

and his family have continued making payments on the
First Security loan; correct?

As far as you know?
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